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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

DANILO PASCUAL,

:

Case NO.900274-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for criminal homicide,
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(Supp. 1990), as the appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme
Court on May 18, 1990.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court committed plain error when

it failed to give an eyewitness identification jury instruction.
The requirements for finding plain error, as contained in State
v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, Eldredge v.
Utah, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), are 1) that the error be obvious to
the trial court, and 2) that the error be harmful.
2.

Whether trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance when he 1) failed to request an eyewitness jury

instruction, 2) failed to object to a jury instruction negating a
self-defense justification, and 3) pursued a certain theory of
the case and abandoned a certain line of questioning.

The test

for determining whether counsel's conduct was constitutionally
infirm, as contained in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 275
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), is 1) whether counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,
and 2) whether counsel's performance prejudiced defendant.

The

standard for reviewing the wording of jury instructions is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

State v. Aly, 782

The choice of which jury

instruction the trial court gives is a legal conclusion which is
reviewed under a correctness standard.

State v. Mitchell, 779

P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989).
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion and

committed prejudicial error when it refused to admit evidence of
a fire allegedly set to defendant's house two days after the
homicide.

The standard of review is whether the court abused its

discretion in denying admission of the evidence, and whether any
error was harmful.

State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah

1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 27, 1988, defendant was charged with one count
of criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree
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felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (Record
[hereinafter R.] at 1). Gary Gale originally appeared as counsel
for defendant but withdrew and Robert Phillips substituted as
counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing (R. at 12).
An October 31, 1988, trial setting was continued by
stipulation of the parties (R. at 62). The matter came on for
trial by jury on December 6, 7 and 8, 1988, in the Second
Judicial District Court for Weber County, the Honorable Stanton
M. Taylor, district judge, presiding (R. at 65-68).

During

trial, defendant attempted to introduce evidence of a fire which
allegedly occurred at defendant's house two days after the
homicide with which defendant was charged (Transcript
[hereinafter T.] at 311). Counsel for the State objected and,
after an in-chambers discussion, the court sustained the
objection (T. at 316). The court determined that the probative
value of the evidence of a fire, which the court described as
"limited," was substantially outweighed by its unduly prejudicial
nature (T. at 315-16).

Defendant did not ask the court to

instruct the jury on eyewitness identification.

It is unclear

whether defendant objected to the instructions prior to their
being given to the jury.

There is a brief allusion to the

instructions in the transcript, but any discussion of the final
form of the instructions is not provided (T. at 576-78).

After

the jury was instructed, defense counsel said that he had no
challenges to the jury instructions (T. at 624).
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
defendant guilty as charged (R. at 109 and 159). On January 3,
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1989, the court sentenced defendant to a term in the Utah State
Prison of not less than five years and which may be for life,
with a consecutive one year enhancement for use of a firearm.
The court also ordered defendant to pay restitution (R. at 12324).
On February 17, 1989, defendant filed a pro se notice
of appeal (R. at 131). By stipulation, the case was remanded
from the Utah Supreme Court to allow resentencing of defendant in
order for a timely notice of appeal to be filed (R. at 136-40).
Defendant was resentenced on August 28, 1989, and filed a notice
of appeal from that resentencing on September 19, 1989 (R. at
148-51).

The appeal was transferred to this Court from the Utah

Supreme Court on May 18, 1990.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In June of 1988, Todd Salazar, his girlfriend, Natalie
Chase, and their infant son, T.J., lived in a house on 33rd
Street in Ogden, Utah (T. at 91-92 and 97). Todd worked during
the day as a bricklayer, and Natalie worked nights at the Nice
Corporation; they shar€*d baby tending chores, each caring for the
child when the other was at wrork (T. at 93-94).

On Friday, June

24, 1988, Todd got home from work at 3:30-4:00 p.m. and Natalie
left for work at 9:30 p.m. (T. at 97). When Natalie returned
from work at 2:30 a.m., she went next door to a birthday party,
leaving Todd and T.J. at home (T. at 98-99).

The child was

asleep and Todd and a friend were up watching television until
approximately 4:30 a.m., when Natalie came back from the party
(T. at 99). The two went to sleep for about three hours,
awakening at about 9:00 a.m. (T. at 100).
-4-

Natalie decided to go boating with family members about
noon on Saturday, June 25, 1988. Todd stayed home because he was
tired (T. at 100). T.J. was taken to Todd's parents' home; Todd
was sleeping on the couch in the front room when Natalie left (T.
at 101). Todd was wearing a hat and cut-off sweat pants with no
shirt, shoes or socks when Natalie last saw him (T. at 104). The
sweat pants had a small pocket in the back which would hold very
little (T. at 105).
Approximately 8:00 p.m. on June 25, 1988, two 18-year
olds, Jerry Garza and Jaime Gomez, were visiting a friend in a
house near defendant's home (T. at 116 and 492). Neither was
related to Todd Salazar; both knew him, although not well (T. at
115 and 187). Todd was three or four years older than they (T.
at 115). Jerry and Jaime decided to drive to a convenience store
(T. at 116-17 and 176). As they passed defendant's home,
Franklin and Lawrence Lucero and two friends were sitting on
defendant's porch.

The Luceros recognized Jaime and Jerry and

began yelling at them (T. at 117 and 176). There had been bad
blood between Jerry and the Luceros prior to that night (T. at
182).

As Jerry and Jaime drove by, Lawrence remembered that

Jerry had beaten up one of Lawrence's cousins.

Lawrence began

shouting at Jerry, calling him names and telling him to stop and
fight (T. at 447). Jerry and Jaime just drove on by (T. at 117
and 176).
Jerry and Jaime returned from the store, again driving
past the Luceros and their friends at defendant's house (T. at
118-19 and 177). Lawrence called out to Jerry and Jaime, telling
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them to stop and calling them out to fight (T. at 119-20 and
177).

Jerry and Jaime felt outnumbered by the Luceros and their

friends, so they went on to Jaime's uncle's house and told the
three men there that the Luceros wanted to fight (T. at 119-20
and 177-78).

Jerry and Jaime asked Jaime's two uncles and their

friend to return with them to back them up in a fight with the
Luceros (T. at 120, 155, 178 and 204). Jerry left to drop off
the car and asked four or five other friends at another house to
come to the fight as well (T. at 178). At that point no one in
Jerry and Jaime's group had any weapons (T. at 178).
As the nine or ten people with Jerry and Jaime
approached the open field near defendant's house, they saw people
jumping off of defendant's porch and going to their cars (T. at
120).

Jerry saw one of Lawrence's friends go to Lawrence's car,

"[get] into the trunk," then walk over to Lawrence (T. at 17980).

When he saw this, Jerry assumed that Lawrence was then

armed with a knife or a pipe (T. at 180). Jerry went to his car
and got out a knife and another friend got a bat (T. at 180).
Jerry walked toward the field with the knife held behind his back
(T. at 181). Evidently, others in the neighborhood became aware
of the pending fight and gathered at the field (T. at 233 and
269-70).
As Jerry and Jaime walked toward the Lucero group, they
were met by Lawrence and Franklin Lucero and two of their
friends, Ranaldo Hain and Crisostomo Mendoza (T. at 120, 411 and
469).

At this point, defendant was in his house.

He heard the

noise of the groups calling each other on, and looked out to see
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his four friends walking toward a group of ten others (T. at 49496).

Defendant did not know any of the ten but saw a knife and a

bat; he decided to get his sawed-off shotgun from the closet (T.
at 497-500).

Defendant said that he took the gun and one shell

out to stop the fight and scare off the group opposing his
friends (T. at 500-501).

It is clear from the testimony that

neither Todd, Jerry, Jaime, or any of their friends knew
defendant, who was some fifteen years older than they (T. at 145,
159, 197, 239-40, 271 and 519). Defendant did not know Todd,
although defendant's friend, Lawrence Lucero, did (T. at 501-502
and 415-16).
While defendant was in his house getting his shotgun,
the Luceros and their friends were standing in the nearby open
field egging Jerry and Jaime on, calling them on to fight (T. at
183).

The verbal taunts were boiling down to a one on one fight

between Lawrence and Jerry, with their friends and other
onlookers urging them both to drop their weapons and fight hand
to hand (T. at 121, 158-59, 184, 236 and 451). It is at this
juncture that the evidence produced by the State and that
produced by defendant diverges.

The prosecution's witnesses

placed Todd Salazar across the street on the porch and lawn of
his own home until defendant and his friends crossed the street
and began beating him.

Defendant's witnesses said that Todd

walked across the street and joined in the fight in the open
field.

The State's version of the evidence follows first.
During the verbal sparring between the Luceros and

Jaime and Jerry, Jon Martinez left the field and walked across
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the street to talk to the victim, who was sitting on the porch of
his home, smoking (T. at 206-207).

Martinez had just come to

watch the fight and went over to ask Todd if Todd was going to
come to watch, too (T. at 207). Todd answered that he wasn't,
saying he had something cooking and would stay at his house (T.
at 207-208).

Martinez walked back to the corner of the street

and listened to the two groups in the field argue (T. at 208).
When the two factions were arguing in the field, urging
Jerry and Lawrence to fight without weapons, Lawrence said that
his group did not have weapons (T. at 159). At that point,
Jaime's uncle, Rumaldo Gomez, spied defendant, who was walking
from his house and up to the Luceros through the bushes (T. at
159-60).

Rumaldo saw that defendant had his hand behind his back

and said that defendant had a gun (T. at 160-61).

Defendant

pulled the gun out, cocked it, and said "[Y]eah, . . . I got a
gun" (T. at 161). Defendant pointed the gun at Rumaldo and
Johnny Gomez, who immediately turned and ran across the street,
in the direction of the victim's house (T. at 161-62, 169, 18485, 210, 239-40, 275-76, and 507). The whole crowd began to run
from defendant, escaping down the street, through Todd's yard,
running in every direction (T. at 125, 277 and 507). No punches
were thrown until after the gun was displayed and defendant and
his friends had chased the others across the street to Todd's
house (T. at 122, 127, 210-11 and 240-42).
As the Gomezes and the neighborhood boys ran from
defendant down the alley near Todd's house, they saw Todd for the
first time (T. at 123, 126, 187, 233-35, 241-42, and 277). Todd
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stood at his house, looking confused as all the young men ran
past (T. at 242).
Jaime Gomez, running from defendant, had crossed the
street and reached the corner of Todd's carport when Todd stepped
off of his porch (T. at 127). Two of the men from the Lucero
group, Cris Mendoza and defendant, ran across to where Todd was,
near the porch, and began to kick and hit him (T. at 127, 212,
and 242). Todd tried to defend himself by hitting back (T. at
212).

When Jaime saw the two men fighting with Todd, he turned

back to help him.

Jaime hit one of the men and Todd started

running toward his house (T. at 128). Cris Mendoza originally
was fighting "toe-to-toe" with Todd when defendant came up behind
Todd and hit Todd with the gun (T. at 128-29).

Todd had a set of

car keys in his hand; he did not have a knife (T. at 129). Jaime
ran back to where defendant, Cris, and Todd were fighting and
struck either defendant or Cris with his fist; Todd ran toward
his house.

Todd had not reached the porch when defendant or Cris

jumped him again.

At that point, Jaime noticed the gun and

warned Todd about the weapon (T. at 130).
Jaime ran toward the alley with Todd right behind him.
This path lead them to the carport and away from defendant and
the gun (T. at 130-31).

Jaime got around Todd's car in the

carport, and turned to see that defendant and Cris were no more
than five feet behind Todd (T. at 131). Jaime saw defendant
point the gun at Todd's back; Jaime turned to run again and heard
a shot.

Jaime looked back and saw Todd fall.

Jaime ran to the

alley where he told the others who had run that Todd had been
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shot; everyone ran back from the alley (T. at 132). When Jaime
came out of the alley, he saw Todd lying on the ground with a
hole in his back, and Cris and defendant moving back across the
street (T. at 133). Jaime tried to help Todd but nothing could
be done (T. at 134).
Others who had run from defendant saw defendant and
Cris attack Todd and Todd try to defend himself.

They could see

that Todd did not have any weapons and that he had no pockets in
which to conceal a weapon (T. at 212). Jonny Martinez heard the
shot as he ran toward where Todd was fighting with defendant.

At

the sound, Martinez looked up to see Todd fall forward on his
face (T. at 213). Defendant then walked up to where Todd lay,
called him an "F'ing punk," and hit Todd on the right forehead
with the gun.
214-25).

Defendant then ran back across the street (T. at

Martinez told his friends to call an ambulance, then

tried to keep Todd breathing until authorities arrived (T. at
216-17).
One witness who was not involved in the argument at the
open field next to defendant's house was Marcy Rodriguez.

She

lived next door to Todd and saw him standing on his front porch
while the argument was going on across the street from her house
(T. at 279-80).

She never saw Todd cross the street to the

argument (T. at 282). She did see that the argument never turned
to blows, "They just argue" (T. at 281). She saw the men
(defendant and Cris) chasing the boys across the street to the
corner where Todd lived (T. at 281 and 535-36).

She also could

see defendant's gun as he crossed the street (T. at 282).
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When the police officers arrived, they found Todd lying
near his car with a wound in his back (T. at 287). A search of
the area turned up no weapons (T. at 287 and 298). Natalie
Chase's father received word about 9:30 p.m. that Todd had been
shot (T. at 302). He went to Todd's house where he saw the outer
door standing ajar; he entered and found food on the coffee table
in the front room, and the television set on (T. at 303). He
turned off the television and secured the house (T. at 304).
Officers were directed to defendant's house by the
young men at Todd's house.

They performed a consent search and

found no one and no weapon in the house (T. at 292-93).

Some

three hours later, after defendant surrendered himself at the
police station, officers returned to defendant's home and found
an eight inch knife in a garbage can outside of the house, and a
twenty to twenty-four inch 2 x 2 thrown under a truck in
defendant's driveway (T. at 299-300 and 307-308).

The officers

never located the shotgun used by defendant (T. at 309).
At the time he was shot, Todd was wearing only cut-off
sweat pants, underpants, and athletic shoes (T. at 377). The
gunshot wound in Todd's back showed stippling from the gunpowder,
and the wad and about forty pellets from the shell were found in
Todd's chest cavity (T. at 328 and 381). Expert testimony
established that the muzzle of the gun was approximately two to
three feet from Todd's back when the shot was fired (T. at 382,
393 and 570). The wound was seven and three quarter inches from
the base of Todd's neck and slightly to the right of the middle
of his back (T. at 378). The shot traveled from the right back
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to the left chest, passing through the left lung and portions of
the heart (T. at 380). The wound and trajectory were consistent
with a shot fired horizontally as Todd was turning away (T. at
382 and 394). Todd had abrasions above the right eyebrow,
consistent with Martinez's testimony that defendant hit Todd with
the shotgun after Todd was lying on the ground (T. at 383, 385
and 215). Todd had other fresh injuries, consistent with the
testimony of being kicked and punched prior to the time he was
shot (T. at 384-89, 127-28, 211-13 and 242-43).
The autopsy also showed that Todd had a blood alcohol
content of .04 milligrams percent; this was consistent with
having consumed "a little more than half a can of Utah beer."
(T. at 397). Todd also had a quantity of cocaine and its
metabolite in his blood and urine.

The blood amounts were

••fairly low" and the urine amounts higher.

Based on that, the

medical examiner concluded that ingestion of the cocaine had
taken place "at least hours before [Todd's] death" (T. at 398).
He testified that the alcohol and the cocaine would work against
each other in their effects because alcohol is a depressant and
cocaine is a stimulant (T. at 398-99).
In sometimes confusing and contradictory testimony,
defendant and his friends painted a different picture of Todd's
involvement that evening.

Defendant's friend, Ranaldo Hain, said

that the Lucero brothers, Ranaldo, and another friend, Crisostomo
Mendoza, faced a crowd of twenty or more (T. at 409 and 411).
Lawrence Lucero told the group that he just wanted to fight Jerry
Garza (T. at 412). Just then, someone threw a beer can at
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Crisostomo (Cris), and defendant and Cris began fighting with the
victim and the person who threw the can (T. at 412). Ranaldo
said that Todd was with the person who threw the can, on the
sidewalk at the street corner next to the open field during the
argument (T. at 412-13).

As the four fought, defendant pulled up

the gun, loaded it, and the other boys began running (T. at 413).
Ranaldo and Lawrence stayed on 33rd Street as the fight somehow
moved across the street to Todd's house (T. at 414-18).

As the

fight continued at Todd's house, Martinez told Lawrence, "that's
Todd, and Lawrence said —

then Lawrence recognized him and was

going to try to break it and then the gun went off."
415).

Todd was Lawrence's friend (T. at 415-16).

(T. at

When the

shotgun went off, Todd was trying to get into his car; Ranaldo
thought that this explained the fact that Todd was shot in the
back (T. at 417).
On cross-examination, Ranaldo gave a confusing account
of where and how the fight started.

His identification of Todd

as the person standing on the sidewalk when the beer can was
thrown was tenuous.

The following exchange between the

prosecutor and Ranaldo occurred:
Q [By Mr. Richards] Okay. But Todd — you
remember seeing Todd Salazar standing there?
A He was — yeah, he was standing next to
that guy [the one who had thrown the can].
Q Now, do you know Todd Salazar?
A I seen him before, but I didn't remember
him that day.
Q Okay. But you remember him now and that
was the person standing there?
A Yeah.
(T. at 431). The testimony was also confusing about where
Ranaldo was standing and the movements of the groups just before
-13-

and during the fight (T. at 431, 433, 435, 436 and 438). It is
also confusing about when Ranaldo first saw defendant's gun, and
when, in the course of the fight, defendant loaded it (T. at 43238).
Lawrence Lucero testified that Todd was a friend of his
and that Lawrence tried to break up the fight when he saw that
defendant was hitting Todd (T. at 450, 453, 455, and 463).
Lawrence confirmed that he held only sought to fight with Jerry
Garza when he and his friends went into the field (T. at 450).
When Lawrence and his friends walked out to fight, there were
twenty to twenty-five people facing them across the field, some
standing in the field and others on the sidewalk (T. at 450-51).
Lawrence and Jerry were prepciring to fight when someone threw a
beer can at Cris and "it all broke out."

Defendant ran to Cris,

who was facing two people (T. at 451). Lawrence first saw Todd
across the street, in the gutter, fighting with Cris and
defendant (T. at 452). He n€*ver saw Todd with a weapon (T. at
452).

He did see defendant with the shotgun in the field before

the fighting started.

Defendant loaded the gun when defendant

saw Cris fighting and ran to help him (T. at 452-53).

Lawrence

saw defendant and Todd fighting on Todd's carport and saw
defendant swing the gun at Todd (T. at 454). Lawrence thought
Todd had stopped fighting when defendant swung the gun and it
discharged (T. at 455 and 462-63).
Crisostomo Mendoza testified that he had gone into the
field with Lawrence and the others as a back up (T. at 470). He
saw defendant when "the man threw me a beer" and the fight
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started (T. at 472). Cris did not see the gun at first, but then
later saw it as defendant raised it into the air (T. at 473-74).
After the gun was shown, the people facing defendant began
running away (T. at 474 and 481). Cris did not see Todd, did not
know Todd, and did not know if the person fighting defendant was
the person who was shot (T. at 474-75).

Cris testified:

Q [By Mr. Phillips] And do you know who
Todd is?
A No, sir.
Q Do you know the person who got shot?
A No, sir.
Q Okay. Did you see the person Danny
[defendant] was fighting with?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you know if that was the person who
got shot?
A I don't know, sir.
Q Did you see anyone with a knife then when
Danny was fighting?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A I saw some sharp object, you know, Todd
starting to swing to Danny and Danny, you
know, tried to swing the gun to some guys,
you know.

Q Could you see, you said, a sharp thing?
What did you say?
A Sharp object.
Q Sharp — do you know if it was a knife or
not?
A I'm not sure, you know.
Q A set of keys maybe?
A No. He tried to swing, you know. I don't
know.
(T. at 474-75).

Cris did not know if the man who was shot was

the same man that had the sharp object (T. at 477 and 483).
Defendant testified that he did not know Todd Salazar
and had nothing against him; however, when he saw Todd that
evening, he thought Todd did not look like himself (T. at 493 and
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504).

In the early evening, the Lucero brothers, Ranaldo Hain,

Cris Mendoza and defendant's "lady" were all at defendant's
house, drinking and talking (T. at 492-93).

Defendant was inside

the house when Jerry and Jaime drove by, but he did hear yelling
from outside (T. at 494). He eventually stepped outside and saw
his four friends walking across the field toward a group of about
ten people on the opposite sidewalk (T. at 495-96).

Defendant

did not see any weapons with his friends but saw a knife and a
baseball bat in the other group (T. at 495 and 497). Defendant
went back into his room and took out his sawed-off shotgun and
one shell (T. at 497-98 and 500-501).

He said that he took the

gun out to stop the fight and scare the others away; however, he
admits that he carried the gun behind his body as he walked out
of his house and followed his friends into the field (T. at 501
and 506).
When defendant got up to his friends, they stood only a
short distance from the other ten people (T. at 501). Defendant
saw Todd standing with second group of ten people who had
gathered at some point (T. at 501-502).

The people who had

gathered were neighborhood people (T. at 521). Todd, whom
defendant did not even know, was "yelling and saying some bad
words" (T. at 502). Defendant thought Todd was really drunk (T.
at 504). Defendant's attention was drawn to Todd and defendant
was never aware that a beer can had been thrown at Cris.
Defendant saw his friends run toward the other group, and he ran
too (T. at 505). All this time, defendant held the gun behind
him.

When asked, "[I]f you're holding the gun that way, how can
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you stop the fight or scare everybody away if you're hiding the
gun?"

(T. at 506) • Defendant responded:
A Okay. I didn't — I didn't hide the gun.
The gun is really showing about that much and
that you can see it.
Q [By Mr. Phillips] Well, why is it behind
you at all?
A I don't — I really don't know, but — I
just don't know why —why it's in my —
behind my back, but the thing that I know,
it's in my back and it's showing about that
much and they can see it.
Q Okay. Then what do you do with it?
A Okay. When — when the fight was
starting — when the fight was starting I
pull it — I pull it and I point it — I
point it in the air.

(T. at 506-507 and 528). When defendant pulled the gun into
view, someone yelled, "He's got a gun," and the crowd began to
run away (T. at 507 and 531). Defendant loaded the gun when the
person with Todd kicked defendant in the knee (T. at 507-508).
Defendant advanced toward the sidewalk where the
opposing group of people had been and loaded the gun as the boys
were running away (T. at 532-33).

Cris ran toward Todd to chase

him and defendant followed (T. at 535-36).

Defendant said that

he and Cris fought with Todd as they moved across the street to
Todd's carport (T. at 540). Defendant swung the gun at Todd
because Todd was swinging at him with a butterfly knife which had
a six inch blade and a six inch handle (T. at 512 and 537). Todd
never struck defendant with the knife, but defendant struck Todd
with the shotgun (T. at 513-15, and 541-44).

Defendant thought

that Todd was really drunk, which explained why he continued to
fight against defendant who carried the shotgun (T. at 543).
When defendant hit Todd with the gun, Todd turned; defendant
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swung the gun again and it fired (T. at 515, 545 and 549),
Defendant had said in his statement to police that he fired from
about five feet away; at trial, he testified that he was close
enough to Todd to strike him with the gun (T. at 548-49).
On rebuttal, James Gaskill from the Weber State Crime
Lab testified that he conducted test firings of sawed-off
shotguns with barrel lengths ranging from eighteen to twenty-six
inches (T. at 569-70).

These tests demonstrated that the

distance from the gun muzzle to Todd was two to three feet when
the gun was fired (T. at 570). The position of the body and the
angle of the wound and the trajectory indicated that the shot
came from on the carport or from out on the lawn a foot or two
(T. at 572).
Todd and Natalie did not have any guns and the only
knife located in the house was a paring knife (T. at 106). When
Natalie returned to the house the day after the shooting, she
found the paring knife where she had left it in the kitchen sink
on Friday (T. at 113). She also found a blanket and pillow on
the couch where Todd had been sleeping, and a plate with a
jalapeno pepper and salt on the table in front of the couch (T.
at 110). Next to the plate was a can of beer which had been
opened but was still full (T. at 113). In the kitchen was a full
bowl of spaghetti on the kitchen counter (T. at 110).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's failure to give a Telfaire-Long
eyewitness identification jury instruction was not plain error.
That instruction is mandated when the identification of the
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perpetrator is at issue; it is not applicable to the present
case.

Defendant admitted to police and testified at trial that

he was the one who shot Todd Salazar.

An eyewitness

identification instruction, such as that dictated by State v.
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), was not appropriate; consequently
it was not error, let alone plain error, for the court not to
have given that instruction.

Other instructions given

sufficiently advised the jury of the law regarding the
credibility of witnesses and their ability to perceive and
correctly recall the events surrounding the shooting.
Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance.

Because the eyewitness identification instruction

from Long was not applicable to this case, it was not deficient
performance for counsel not to have requested the instruction.
Neither was defendant prejudiced when the instruction was not
requested.

He admitted shooting the victim; his defense was that

the gun fired accidentally, or that he was acting in selfdefense.

A Long instruction would not have altered the outcome

of the trial.
Trial counsel was also not ineffective for failure to
object to jury instruction no. 10. That instruction was a
correct statement of the law and counsel's performance cannot be
deficient for failing to object to a correct instruction.

Even

if the instruction had been erroneous, defendant was not
prejudiced by it.

The credible evidence was that defendant shot

Todd in the back from a distance of approximately five feet.
credible evidence also demonstrates that the victim was not
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The

involved in the fighting until defendant and one of his friends
entered the victim's property and attacked him.

Todd was unarmed

and trying to escape defendant's attack when he was shot.

A jury

instruction which parroted the statute regarding self-defense
would not have changed the outcome of this trial.
The last ineffectiveness claim is also without merit.
Counsel did not, as defendant now claims, abandon his theory of
the case mid-trial.

Based on defendant's own testimony, he

either accidentally shot Todd, or shot him in self-defense.
While it is not totally clear what theory of the case defense
counsel supposedly abandoned, it appears that the theory
defendant now claims was that the victim was killed as part of a
gang war.

As the trial court determined, the fact that Garza or

Gomez may have been part of a Hispanic gang was not material if
defendant was not aware of the gang affiliation.

When

defendant's counsel became aware that defendant could not testify
whether he knew of a gang association at the time of the
shooting, counsel prop€*rly did not pursue that avenue.

Again,

defendant was not prejudiced even if his counsel's trial actions
were deficient.

There was no evidence that the victim was part

of a gang; in fact, the evidence supports the opposite
conclusion.

If defendcint was fearful of a gang affiliation, that

fact lost its impact when it became clear that defendant chased
the supposed gang members across the street with a shotgun.

When

defendant attacked Todd Salazar, whose affiliation with the
alleged gang was not demonstrated, in Todd's own yard, then shot
Todd in the back as he was trying to flee, any alleged fear of a
gang was irrelevant.
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Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to admit testimony that defendant's home had been
set on fire two days after the shooting.
irrelevant to the issues of the homicide.

That evidence was
At most, it bolstered

defendant's testimony as to why he ran away after the shooting.
That testimony did not need bolstering, as the jury could accept
that defendant ran because he was afraid and confused.

The

evidence of the fire clearly did not justify the shooting itself.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR TRIAL COUNSEL TO NOT
REQUEST, AND THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO GIVE, AN
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION.
Defendant's first claim of error is that it was
manifest error for the trial court not to give an eyewitness
identification jury instruction pursuant to State v. Long, 721
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

As a corollary, he alludes to his second

claim of error, i.e., trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance for failing to request such an instruction.

That

second claim will be addressed in Point II.
When an issue is not properly preserved at the trial
level, an appellate court may nonetheless address the issue under
the plain error doctrine.

This is provided for by rule in the

context of jury instructions.

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (1990).

In

State v. Verde# 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court
said:
[When] faced with a claim that a
particular assertion of instructional error
not raised at trial should be considered on
appeal because failure to do so would result
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in manifest injustice under Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 19(c), we will determine
whether to review such a claim of error under
the same standard we use when determining the
presence of plain error under Utah Rule of
Evidence 103(d).
770 P.2d at 122.

In State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert.

denied, Eldredqe v. Utah, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme
Court, construing rule 103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, stated:
The first requirement for a finding of plain
error is that the error be "plain," i.e.,
from our examination of the record, we must
be able to say that it should have been
obvious to a trial court that it was
committing error. . . . The second and
somewhat interrelated requirement for a
finding of plain error is that the error
affect the substantial rights of the accused,
i.e., that the error be harmful.
773 P.2d at 35 (citations and footnote omitted).

Under this

test, the trial court's failure to give an eyewitness
identification instruction was not plain error.

Such an

instruction was not applicable to this case because defendant's
identification was not an issue.
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Long, directed:
that in cases tried from this date forward,
trial courts shall give such a[ Telfaire]
instruction whenever eyewitness
identification is a central issue in a case
and such an Instruction is requested by the
defense.
721 P.2d at 492 (emphasis added).

The instruction mandated by

the Court is patterned after the case of United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

The Telfaire case

addressed the "need for a special instruction on the key issue of
identification," and cited a series of United States Supreme
Court cases "focusing on the very real danger of mistaken
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identification as a threat to justice."
(emphasis added).

469 F.2d at 555

The Long case also specifically applied to

addressing "the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness
identification."

721 P.2d at 490. All of the Utah cases at

which a Telfaire-type instruction was sought, both pre- and postLong, specifically describe the issue as one of eyewitness
identification.

See, e.g., State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359

(Utah 1980); State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah 1981);
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253-54 (Utah 1984); State v.
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982); State v. Watson, 684 P.2d
39, 40 (Utah 1984); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah
1984); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985); State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d
246, 247 (Utah 1985); State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, 1380-81
(Utah 1986); State v. Quevedo, 735 P.2d 51, 52 (Utah 1987); State
v. Remington, 737 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743
P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, Branch v. Utah, 485
U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 881-82 (Utah
1988); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989); State v.
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 652-53 (Utah 1989).
Defendant now asks this Court to extend the Long
holding to require a trial court to give the Long eyewitness
identification instruction in all cases where eyewitnesses
testify about the facts of the case.

Such testimony does not

trigger the need for a cautionary Long instruction if the
identification of the perpetrator is not an issue.
Supreme Court has said:
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As the Utah

A criminal defendant is entitled to have a
jury instructed on his theory of the case if
there is any substantial evidence to justify
such an instruction. . . . [A] defendant is
not entitled to an instruction which is
redundant or repetitive of principles
enunciated in other instructions given to the
jury. The principal points of defendant's
proposed instruction dealt with the state's
burden of proof and the factors to consider
in weighing the testimony of an eye-witness.
All of these factors were adequately dealt
with in other instructions presented to the
jury by the trial court. As a result, we
cannot agree that the denial of the proposed
instruction constituted reversible error.
State v. McCumberf 622 P.2d at 359.
In the present case, defendant apparently claims that a
cautionary instruction should be given any time an eyewitness
testifies, whether the issue is one of identification or not.

As

is clear from the testimony given in the present case, different
people perceive the same events differently.

It may also be that

the perception is the same, but, for whatever reason, a witness
may testify falsely about what occurred.

The end result is that

a jury is given evidence which is contradictory.

However, as the

Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701 (Utah
1985):
The fact that there was contradictory
testimony, without more, is not grounds for
reversal, State v. Watts, Utah 675 P.2d 566,
568 (1983). "The conflicting evidence was
before the jury, and it was the jury's
responsibility to evaluate its significance.
State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289,
292 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044 . . .
(1983).
700 P.2d at 703 (additional citations omitted).

If a jury is

properly instructed as how to evaluate conflicting testimony, a
cautionary eyewitness identification instruction (in a nonidentification case) is not required.
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In the case now before the Court# the jury was fully
instructed as to its responsibility to determine the credibility
of the witnesses and to reconcile conflicting evidence (R. at 73,
88, 89, and 91; copies of these instructions are attached as
Addendum A).

A cautionary eyewitness identification instruction

was not applicable to this case.

Defendant reported to the

police station a few hours after the shooting and admitted that
he was the one who fired the shot (T. at 307 and 548). Defendant
also testified at trial that he was the one who fired the fatal
shot (T. at 515, 545, and 548-49).

Clearly, identification of

the perpetrator was not an issue in this case. Accordingly, the
Long eyewitness identification instruction was not applicable and
it was not plain error for the trial court to not give the
instruction.
POINT II
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE.
Defendant contends that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance on three bases:

1) Counsel failed to

request a Long eyewitness identification instruction; 2) Counsel
failed to object to jury instruction no. 10; and 3) Counsel
abandoned his theory of the case at mid-trial because counsel had
failed to adequately investigate this case before trial.
This Court addressed the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987), in which it said:
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
. • . (1984), the United States Supreme Court
established the standard for determining
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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
at trial. To prevail, the defendant must
demonstrate, first, that counsel's
representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment,
and second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 690 . . . .
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and
interpreted the Strickland standard for
determining ineffective assistance claims.
See, e.g., State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah
1986).
746 P.2d at 275 (parallel citations omitted).

Interpreting the

test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Utah
Supreme Court said:
Defendant must prove that specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance.

Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant. . . . To be found
sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must
affirmatively show that a "reasonable
probability" exists that, but for counsel's
error, the result would have been different.
We have defined "reasonable probability" as
that sufficiemt to undermine confidence in
the reliability of the verdict.
State v. Frame 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (footnote omitted).
Applying this test to the present case, it is clear that
defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel's performance was
defective or that defendant was prejudiced by that performance.
A.

Counsel Was Not Deficient for Failure to Request
an Eyewitness Identification Instruction.

As noted in Point I, an eyewitness identification
instruction was not applicable to the present case because
defendant's identification as the perpetrator was not an issue.
Since the instruction was not applicable, trial counsel's
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performance was not deficient for failing to request the
instruction.
B.

Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing
to Object to Jury Instruction No. 10.

Defendant's next contention is that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance when counsel failed to object to
jury instruction no. 10.

In passing, defendant also alleges that

giving instruction no. 10 was plain error; however, defendant
does not analyze this issue under the plain error doctrine.

Utah

Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c) reads:
No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
Although defendant's trial counsel did not object to instruction
no. 10, defendant could have now challenged the instruction under
rule 19(c).

However, it was not error for the court to use

instruction no. 10, because the instruction was not a
misstatement of the law.

Even if it were error, under the test

cited in State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied,
Eldredge v. Utah, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), as discussed in Point I,
the error was not plain, nor was it harmful.

Since the

instruction was not a misstatement of the law, it was not plain
that giving the instruction was error.

As will be further

developed below, the instruction, if error, was harmless at best.
In general,
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[t]he trial court has a duty to instruct the
jury on the law applicable to the facts of
the case. Encompassed in this duty is the
right of the defendant to have his theory of
the case presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable way.
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).

While instructions

are often couched in statutory language, it is not required that
they be so. As the Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Clayton,
646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982):
[IInstructions need not be given with any
particular words or phrases. Rather this
Court has warned that care must be taken
". . .to use language which the jury would
understand . . . . ' • State v. Garcia, 11 Utah
2d 67, 71, 355 P.2d 57, 60 (1960)[ cert.
denied, Garcia v. Utah, 366 U.S. 970 (1961)].
646 P.2d at 725. More recently, the Court said:
Instructions generally ought to be drafted
with a view to assisting the jury to
understand the issues they have to decide.
Too often instructions simply repeat arid,
dense statutory language that the trial judge
does not relate concretely to the issues in a
case.
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988).

The standard

for review of the wording of jury instructions is whether the
trial court abused its discretion.
550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549,

The choice of which jury instruction

the trial court gives is a legal conclusion which is reviewed
under a correctness standard*

In State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d

1116 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court said:
[W]e accord [a] trial court's legal
conclusion no particular deference on review
and instead appraise it for correctness.
779 P.2d at 1123 (citation omitted).
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The analysis of the propriety of a certain instruction
does not end with a finding that the instruction was erroneous.
[A] criminal conviction is not reversed
because of an erroneous jury instruction
unless the error is of such gravity that it
could cause substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights. A reasonable probability
of a more favorable result for defendant in
the absence of such error must exist.
State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983).

Thus, the

harmless error standard is applied if a court determines that an
instruction given was incorrect.
In defendant's brief, he titles this issue as one of
ineffective assistance and of plain error; however, he only
analyzes the issue as ineffective assistance.

Under this

analysis, if the jury was properly instructed or if an erroneous
instruction did not prejudice defendant, trial counsel's failure
to object to the instruction was not ineffective assistance.
On the last day of trial, defense counsel proposed two
jury instructions, one regarding defense of persons or property,
and one regarding use of force in defense of persons which is
virtually identical to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1990) (R. at
97-100).

On the first day of trial, the State submitted several

proposed instructions (R. at 101-106).

One of these instructions

was given as instruction no. 10 (R. at 102). Defendant's theory
that he acted in defense of himself or another was contained in
instruction no. 13, which reads:
Conduct which is justified is a defense to
prosecution for any offense based on the
conduct. The defense of justification may be
claimed when the actor's conduct is in
defense of persons or property under the
circumstances described as follows:
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A person is justified in threatening or in
using force against another when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to defend himself or a
third person against such other's imminent
use of unlawful force; however, a person is
justified in using force which is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he reasonably believes that
the force is necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to himself or to a
third person or to prevent the commission of
a forcible felony.
A person is not justified in using force
under the circumstances listed above if he
initially provokes the use of force against
himself with the intent to use force as an
excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the
assailant.
(R. at 85). This instruction is a virtual restatement of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) and (2)(a).1

It is also virtually

That statute reads, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is justified in threatening
or using force against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to defendant himself
or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a
person is justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury only if he reasonably believes
that the force is necessary to prevent death
or serious bodily injury to himself or a
third person, or to prevent the commission of
a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using
force under the circumstances specified in
paragraph (1) of this section if he:
(a) Initially provokes the use of
force against himself with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily
harm upon the assailant; or
(b) Is attempting to commit,
committing, or fleeing after the
commission or attempted commission of a
felony; or
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged
in a combat by agreement, unless he
withdraws from the encounter and
effectively communicates to such other
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identical to the first three paragraphs of defendant's proposed
jury instruction (R. at 99).
Instruction no. 10 was requested by the State, and
reads:
You are instructed that in any prosecution
for criminal homicide it shall be no defense
to the prosecution that the defendant was a
party to any duel, mutual combat, or other
consenual [sic] altercation, if during the
course of the duel, combat, or altercation
any deadly weapon was used.
(R. at 81 and 102). Defendant complains that this instruction is
a misstatement of the law because it does not parrot the language
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2)(c).
Jury instructions do not have to be couched in the
exact language of a statute.
266 (Utah 1988).

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,

The trial court is obligated to give a correct

statement of the applicable law to the jury.

Id. at 264. Jury

instruction no. 10 appears to come from statutory and case law
that preceded the current criminal code; this case law has never
been overturned.

The law of justification in the context of a

homicide once provided:
Homicide is excusable in either of the
following cases:
(1) When committed by accident and
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful
means, with usual and ordinary caution and
without any unlawful intent.
(2) When committed by accident and
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any
sudden and sufficient provocation or upon a
sudden combat, when no undue advantage is
Cont. person his intent to do so and
the other notwithstanding continues or
threatens to continue the use of unlawful
force.
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taken nor any dangerous weapon used and when
the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual
manner.
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738, 741 (1947) (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 103-28-8 (1943)).

In the Johnson case, the Utah

Supreme Court quoted the definition of "combat" as: "A fight, a
contest,

a struggle

for

supremacy,

a duel . . . . " 185 P.2d at

742 (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary, Second
Edition).

It appears, then, that instruction no. 10 came from

Utah law as it read prior to the present statute, and from the
Johnson case as it interpreted a former statute.
Although the current statute does not use the same
language as the previous statute, the current statute encompasses
the same theory.

Instead of couching the justification in the

use of a deadly weapon during the course of mutual combat, the
current statute uses broader terms.

The present statute reads,

in pertinent part5
[A] person is justified in using force which
is intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury [i.e., a deadly weapon]
only if he reasonably believes that the force
is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself[.]
(2) A person is not justified in using
force under the ciarcumstances specified in
paragraph (1) of this section if he:

(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in
a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws
from the encounter and effectively
communicates to such other person his
intent to do so and the other
notwithstanding continues or threatens to
continue the use of unlawful force.
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Utah Code Ann, § 76-2-402,

Under present law, use of a deadly

weapon is not justified when defendant was the aggressor or
engaged in combat by agreement (mutual combat).

This is the law

as stated in instruction no. 10.
Present law adds a qualifier to that statement of the
law, which is missing from instruction no. 10. However,
defendant has not argued that the lack of that qualifier was
error; he has only argued that the language about use of a deadly
weapon in mutual combat not being a defense was a misstatement of
the law (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.] at 19-20).
As noted above, that language is included in the broader language
of the present statute, and is not error.

Furthermore, there was

no evidence adduced at trial which would support giving the
qualifying language as an instruction.

As noted above, "[t]he

trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the facts of the case."
added).

Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 (emphasis

Since the facts of the case did not support an

instruction about defendant withdrawing from a fight, the court
had no duty to instruct regarding withdrawal.

State v.

Moritzsky# 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Since instruction no. 10 was not erroneous, especially
when read in conjunction with instruction no. 13, it was not
deficient performance for defendant's trial counsel not to object
to the court giving that instruction.
C.

Counsel's Conduct of Defendant's Case Did
Not Deny Defendant Effective Assistance.

Defendant argues that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance when his counsel failed to investigate the case
-33-

properly prior to trial, and subsequently abandoned his theory of
the case in mid-trial.

Defendant does not explain with

specificity what investigation was not done, or how a different
investigation would have changed the outcome of his trial.

The

main thrust of his argument was that his counsel began the trial
focusing on supposed gang associations between the victim and
Garza and Gomez and their friends, on one side, and defendant and
his friends on the other side.

This was somehow tied to defense

counsel's statement regarding abandonment of evidence of
defendant's state of mind.

It is also somehow tied to a claimed

failure by counsel in applying the rules of evidence to provide
foundation for entering evidence of the alleged gang
associations.
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is
based on the right to a fair trial.
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).

Strickland v. Washington,

The inquiry as to whether counsel's

performance was deficient "must be whether counsel's assistance
was reasonable considering all the circumstances."
688.

466 U.S. at

As the United States Supreme Court said:
No particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take
account of the variety of circumstances faced
by defense counsel or the range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent a
criminal defendant, Any such set of rules
would interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and
restrict the wide latitude counsel must have
in making tactical decisions.
. . .

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential.
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[A] court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action "might be considered
sound trial strategy."
466 U.S. at 688-89 (citations omitted).
The actions of trial counsel now complained of by
defendant did not fall below the standard of reasonable
professional assistance.

Whether Todd Salazar belonged to a

Chicano group while defendant belonged to a Philippino group i
not material to the outcome of this case.

If defense counsel

began the trial on the premise that defendant feared for his 1
because the victim belonged to a rival gang, that fact is not
clear.

Counsel's opening statement, in pertinent part, reads;
Counsel [for the State] told you about
these two groups. I think she neglected to
tell you that the evidence will be that with
Mr. Pascual and his friends there were five
of them. The other group, little group she
refers to, the evidence will be there was 25
or 27.
She neglects to tell you that Mr. Garza or
Mr. Gomez is the president of the Central
City Cholos. She neglects to tell you that
there were knives and guns and baseball bats
in the 27 people that came just to watch the
fight and to protect the back of the parties
involved.

Other people observe a confrontation between
Danilo and the other fellows and the
Chicanos, the Central City Cholo Group, so it
isn't a matter of walking on the scene.

Counsel will suggest to you that he's [the
victim] kind of an innocent bystander, and I
-35-

suggest to you he was swept into this gang
fight as he came out. I don't know if he
belonged to the gang or not, but Danilo's
sitting at his house on his porch with a lady
he lives with and doesn't have anything
against any of these people except as swept
into a rumbles with a disproportionate number
of people who are armed and with weapons,
(T. at 73-74, 76 and 77-78).

Nothing in this opening statement

suggests that the mention of a possible gang affiliation had any
other purpose than to prejudice the jury against the victim and
the State's witnesses.

Defense counsel did not propose a theory

to the jury that defendant was justified in shooting Todd Salazar
because Todd belonged to a gang.

Counsel's theory was that two

groups of people faced each other to fight and defendant waved
his gun around to scare away the group facing his friends.
Counsel's theory was that Todd had a knife and fought with
defendant (T. at 77). This theory was never abandoned by
counsel.
Defendant's claim that his trial counsel abandoned his
theory of the case contains a misleading partial quote from the
transcript (Br. of App. at 22-23).

At the conclusion of opening

statements, the prosecution objected to defense counsel's
allusion to gang affiliations (T. at 79). After some discussion,
counsel and the court determined that evidence of such an
affiliation would be appropriate if the proper foundation were
laid, and if there was a showing that defendant was aware of the
affiliation (T. at 81). At the close of the State's case, the
prosecutor again raised the issue of defendant introducing
evidence of a gang affiliation.

At that point, defense counsel

said:
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I'm not sure that I'm — I've talked to my
client further since the motion came up and
he's not sure as of the time he advised — I
was advised these people — that he's not
sure of his state of mind at the time, so I'm
not sure. I would be willing to abandon it
rather than get into any further issue on it.
(T. at 404). Taken in the context of the earlier agreement that
defendant would have to show that he was aware of the gang
affiliation before it would be relevant, the above statement by
counsel appears to be that defendant could not say that he knew
of the affiliation at the time of the shooting.

Since counsel

could not establish that defendant knew of the affiliation (which
was a prerequisite to admission of the evidence), counsel
properly abandoned that line of evidence.
Neither was defendant prejudiced by the failure to
introduce evidence of a gang affiliation.

If, as it appears,

defendant was not aware of the affiliation, he could not have
been fearing that affiliation when he armed himself and chased
his opponents across the street with a shotgun.

If he did not

know that Garza, Gomez and their friends were members of a gang,
he could not argue that he feared for his life and the lives of
his friends at the hands of the gang members•

Defense counsel's

decision not to pursue a line of testimony about the victim's
possible gang affiliation was not only proper trial strategy, it
was the only avenue open after defendant apparently was unable to
tell when defendant knew of the supposed affiliation.

Hence, it

did not display ineffective assistance.
Defendant's use of the rules of evidence to argue that
counsel was ineffective for not urging admission of gang
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testimony based on those rules is unavailing.

If defendant had

no knowledge of the gang affiliation, evidence of it would not be
probative of any issue at trial.

If the evidence had no

probative value, it was excludable under rule 402, Utah Rules of
Evidence (1990) (quoted in Point III). Defendant's argument that
two of the State's witnesses should have been questioned about
their gang membership in order to establish a motive to
misrepresent under rule 406, Utah Rules of Evidence, is without
merit.

Gang membership does not automatically make a person a

liar; neither does it automatically establish bias or prejudice.
Any remote probative value it might have had is completely
outweighed by the prejudicial effect such evidence might have.
Consequently, it would have been excluded under rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1990) (quoted in Point III).
As part of trial strategy, defense counsel propounded
theories of defense which were based on defendant's testimony,
which presumably defendant had told counsel before trial.

The

theories were that defendant either fired on Todd in selfdefense, or that the gun accidentally was cocked and then
accidentally discharged, shooting Todd.

Those theories were

followed consistently at trial by counsel.

The alleged gang

affiliation evidence was not material to those theories.

If

defendant now feels that the theory should have been that he was
protecting himself and his friends from a gang assault, defendant
should have tailored his statements to his attorney and his
testimony at trial along those lines.

Such second-guessing of

trial counsel's strategy, strategy which presumably was based on
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what defendant told counsel before trial, is condemned under the
Strickland-Frame test of effective assistance of counsel.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF
A FIRE WHICH OCCURRED TWO DAYS AFTER THE
HOMICIDE FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it
refused to allow defendant to introduce evidence of a fire in
defendant's house which occurred two days after the shooting.
Defendant has couched this argument in terms of rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, and in terms of a sixth amendment right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses.

However, the sixth

amendment right is tempered by the rules of evidence. As
defendant quoted in his brief:
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
requires only that the accused be permitted
to introduce all relevant and admissible
evidence.
State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).
If the evidence sought on cross-examination is irrelevant or
inadmissible under the rules of evidence, defendant had no sixth
amendment right to introduce it.
It is well-settled that:
[i]n reviewing evidentiary rulings made under
rule 403, [an appellate court] will not
overturn a trial court absent an abuse of
discretion. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750,
752 (Utah 1986); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d
60, 64 (Utah 1983). To constitute an abuse
of discretion, the error must have been
harmful. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
120 (Utah 1989).
State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989).
rules of evidence read:
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The pertinent

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 401 (1990) (emphasis added).
All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the
constitution of the state of Utah, statute,
or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Utah R. Evid. 402 (1990).
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1990).

"Unfair prejudice" in this context was

defined in Terry v. Zions Co-Operative Mercantile Institution,
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland
v. Skaqqs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), as:
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial in this
context if it has a tendency to influence the
outcome of the trial by improper means, or if
it appeals to the jury's sympathies, or
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury
to base its decision on something other than
the established propositions of the case.
605 P.2d at 323, n. 31 (citation omitted).
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to allow introduction of evidence of a
fire at defendant's house some two days after the shooting.

That

evidence had minimal relevance at best, and the trial court was
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correct in ruling that its minimal relevance was substantially
outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury.
Defendant sought to introduce evidence of the fire,
not, as he states in his brief, through an officer with knowledge
of the fire, but through an officer who testified that he only
knew about the fire from what he had read in the newspapers (Br.
of App. at 26 and T. at 311; the transcript page is attached as
Addendum B). During a subsequent recess, the admissibility of
the fire evidence was argued, along with other admissibility
issues (T. at 314-17 and 323; attached as Addendum B). The
prosecutor argued that the fire was irrelevant, considering that
it had occurred two days after the shooting, and at a time that
defendant was incarcerated (T. at 314-15).

There was no evidence

that the fire was set by anyone associated with the victim, and
it was misleading to imply that defendant left the scene of the
shooting because of the fire (T. at 315). Defense counsel
responded that evidence of the fire supported the defense theory
that defendant fled the scene out of fear of retaliation (T. at
315).

The court responded that defendant was entitled to explain

why he left, and defendant subsequently testified that he left
because he was fearful of retaliation (T. at 315, 516-17, and
552-53).

But, as the court said, testimony of a fire two days

later may have substantiated, somewhat, defendant's fear;
however, that probative value was "somewhat limited."
315-16).

(T. at

After discussion of other issues, the court said:
I've ruled the fire is irrelevant. It may
have some limited relevance, but it seems to
-41-

me that — the possible prejudicial value
outweighs its relevance and I'm going to
grant a motion in limine not to discuss the
fire from this point on.
(T. at 323; attached as Addendum B ) .
This ruling was not an abuse of discretion.

There is

no claim that defendant shot Todd because he feared retaliation,
and that that fear was then justified by the subsequent fire.
The claim is only that the fire would somehow explain defendant's
flight from the shooting.

That flight was fully explained by

defendant when he testified that he fled because he was afraid
and because he was confused (T. at 516-17 and 552-53).

The jury

could easily accept that explanation of defendant's state of mind
after the shooting without the additional testimony about a fire
set to his house two days later, while he was still in jail.

The

attempt to elicit sympathy for defendant because his house was
set afire, and to imply that Todd was an evil person whom
defendant was justified in killing because Todd's associates
later set the fire, is clearly asking the jury to base its
decision about guilt en something other than the facts of the
crime.

The trial court correctly refused to allow the evidence.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

9 — day of July, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Randine Salerno and Gary L. Gale, Attorneys for defendant, 2568
Washington Blvd., Suite 205, Odgen, Utah 84401, this
July, 1990.

A£'<1.r--Mp

-43-

C

f^>

day of

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

INSTRUCTION NO.

"3

You are to determine what witness to believe and what
parts of their testimony you believe and what weight
you

place

upon

the

testimony

of

the

various

or value

witnesses.

In

making these determinations, you might like to consider some or
all of the following:
1) the demeanor and deportment
the courtroom;
2) the witness1
trial;

interest

3) any tendency
the other;

to favor

in

of the witness in
the

result

of

the

or disfavor one side or

4) the probability or improbability of events
having occurred the way the witness describes
the events;
5) was the witness actually able to see or hear or
otherwise perceive the things described;
6) can this witness now accurately
things the witness observed;

recall

the

7) is the witness able to describe what he
observed accurately and in a form that you can
understand;
8) did the witness make earlier statements or
expressions which are consistent or inconsistent with what is now being said;
9) does the witness speak the truth or not.
But whatever

tests you

use,

the value

of

a witness1

testimony is for you to determine.

73

INSTRUCTION NO.

\ V)

The weight of the evidence is not to be determined by
the number of witnesses testifying on either side.

You should

consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence to determine
which of the witnesses are worthy of greater believability.

You

may find that the testimony of a smaller number of witnesses on
one side is more worthy of belief than the testimony of a greater
number of witnesses on the other side.

88

INSTRUCTION NO.

If you believe any witness has testified falsely as to
any material fact in the case, you are at liberty to disregard
the whole of the testimony of such witness*

You are not bound to

believe all that the witnesses may have testified to nor are you
bound to believe any witness; you may believe one witness against
many or many as against one.
what

weight

to

give

the

With this in mindr you are to judge
testimony

of

the

witnesses

and to

determine what the facts are.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The

constitution

trial judge from making

and

laws

any comment

of

this

state

prohibit

the

about the witnesses or the

evidence, and I am not allowed to assist you in determining your
verdict.
Therefore, you are instructed that if during this trial
I have said or done anything which has suggested that I favor the
claims

or

position

of

either

party,

you

are

not

to

permit

yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion.
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which
witnesses

are,

should prevail.

or

are

not, worthy

of belief, nor

which

party

If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate

an opinion relative to any of these matters, you must

disregard

it.
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ADDENDUM B
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1I

MR. PHILLIPS:

I think on the basis of that —

he's

2

indicated his non-presence at the house and I think that

3

goes to the reason he was not at the house, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

5

Q

6

in the house?

Overruled.

(By Mr. Phillips)

7

MS. KNOWLTON:

Was there a fire the next day

Your Honor, I'm still going to

g

object.

9

particular point of time.

10

It happened the next day.

I

U

MR. PHILLIPS:

MS. KNOWLTON:

This officer was not present

during that.

14
15

I still think that goes to the

feelings, the reason they vacated the house.

12

13

THE COURT:

I think the question

was answered,

but the material was objected to.

16 I

MR. PHILLIPS: Yes.

17

THE COURT:

18 I

It's not at that

And I suppose if he doesn't know

anything about the fire

19 I

MR. PHILLIPS:

20

that.

21

earlier.

22

he didn't,

23

Q

24

fire?

25

A

—
And I didn't know if he said

I thought his answer was at the time he was there

I don't know if he went back.

(By Mr. Phillips)

If he didn't,

Do you know anything about a

Just what I read in the newspaper.
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available.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

*

THE COURT:

5

I see.
That will be the medical examiner,

Do you have other witnesses that

might be called at this time?

6

M S . KNOWLTON:

Yes, Your Honor, another officer.

7

MR. PHILLIPS:

If we do go too fast I wouldn't

8

mind calling my case and we could call them out of

9

order.

10
it

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think that might be an

appropriate thing to do, too.

12

All right.

Let's take a short recess.

13

(WHEREUPON, at this time there was a recess, after

14

which proceedings resumed in chambers with the Court and

15

all counsel present, as follows:)

16

MR. RICHARDS:

Your Honor, we wanted to talk

17

to you for a few m o m e n t s .

18

line of questioning that began with the last officer

19

in regards to this fire that occurred at the Pascual

20

residence.

21

We're concerned with the

The fire took place two days later on Monday

22

morning.

I don't see any relevancy in relating that

23

fire to —

24

long after the time that he had been apprehended and

25

placed in j a i l .

to M r . Pascual running because it happened

In fact, he was probably in jail at
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1

that t i m e .

2I

to infer that for some reason the S a l a z a r people are

3

out to get him and that's the reason he's not turning

4

himself in i s , I t h i n k , a false impression and I'd

5

to get that s t r a i g h t e n e d out now and not h a v e it come

6

out with the next o f f i c e r .

7

We h a v e n o idea w h o started the fire, but

like

MR. P H I L L I P S : We intend to p u r s u e that b e c a u s e

8

that is one of the r e a s o n s he left.

Counsel constantly

9

refers to the fact he didn't go back to the scene of

10

the shooting and that he w a s n ' t at the h o u s e , and I

11

think the v o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n was the very r e a s o n .

12

i n t r o d u c e t h i n g s in e v i d e n c e and they then —

13

or seven w i t n e s s e s about it and I think I'm

14

to respond w h y he w a s n ' t there and the fact that w i t h i n

15

two d a y s t h e r e ' s an attempt to torch his h o u s e , his

16

h o u s e is b u r n e d and t h r e a t s are m a d e I think r e s p o n d s

17

to t h a t .

18

THE COURT:

They

ask six
entitled

I think the risk i s , of c o u r s e ,

19

that —

20

to the issue of w h e t h e r he did or did not d e a l with

21

what he's c h a r g e d with d o i n g .

22

I have.

23

that the jury may be confused by that as going

That would be the concern

Now, o b v i o u s l y I think he's e n t i t l e d to e x p l a i n

24

w h y he left the s c e n e , but I don't think that —

I

25

don't think the fire r e a l l y has a n y t h i n g to d o with that
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other than it may in some respects substantiate the

2

fact that he —

3

I fear that the prejudicial value from that may very

4

well outweigh its probative value because its probative

5

value is somewhat limited.

that his feelings were legitimate, but

6

MR. PHILLIPS:

1

THE COURT:

8 I

MR. PHILLIPS:

9
10
11

I understand.

So I

—

And I'll abide with what Your

Honor says, obviously, but I do feel like that is
supportive of the very feelings he had.
THE COURT:

He's entitled to express why he

12

didn't come in and —

13

of the fire may very well be

14
15

but I think probably the matter

MR. PHILLIPS:

—

I'm not sure it's any —

I'm

not quarreling, but I would like it in the record.

16

I don't think it's any more prejudicial than

17

interjecting the fact that this lady is pregnant, she

18

had another baby and they're living together.

19

things are emotional things to present to the jury and

20

have absolutely no bearing as to did he or did he not

21

commit the offense.

22

that thing to the jury and it hamstrings me if I can't

23

reply to these emotional things.

24

abandon that argument

25

Those

And I'm sure she's going to argue

MR. RICHARDS:

If they want to

—
I guess I don't see any tie-in
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there.

2
3

MR. PHILLIPS:
relate emotional

4

I think it f s an attempt to

—

THE COURT:

I think if you would have objected

5

at the time I probably would have sustained the

6

objection # but because I don't think it has any

7
8

MR. PHILLIPS:

—

Understand it puts me in a

bad position if I object.

9

THE COURT:

I'm going to rule in limine they

10

can't argue that to the jury.

11

won't allow you to bring up the fire.

In

the same respect, I

12

MR. PHILLIPS:

I think that's fair.

13

MR. RICHARDS:

We hadn't intended to argue

14

that because she had a baby for some reason this guy's

15

guilty.

16
17

Is that what you're saying?
THE COURT:

I think that was the implication.

Right?

18

MR. PHILLIPS:

(Shakes head up and down.)

19 I

MR. RICHARDS:

We do intend to argue that he's

20

not like the other people in the —

in the ruckus

21

because here he's living at home with a girl that is

22

in essence his common law wife, they have a family and

23

he's in there watching television when all this

24

happened which makes it unlikely he would be out in

25

the middle of the fracas like these other kids were.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. PHILLIPS:

What's his nickname?

3

M S . KNOWLTON:

Crewey.

4

MR. PHILLIPS:

Crewey. You're right.

5

THE COURT:

6 I

MR. RICHARDS:

7

Yes.

Crewey.
The issue we're here on is the

fire.

e

THE COURT:

I've ruled the fire is irrelevant.

9

It may have some limited relevance, but it seems to

10

me that —

H

its relevance and I'm going to grant a motion in limine

12

not to discuss the fire from this point on.

13

to rule —

14

cocaine in the system until we —

15

to determine from the medical witness what the likely

16

impact of that would b e .

17
18

the possible prejudicial value outweighs

reserve any ruling concerning this issue of

MR. PHILLIPS:

THE COURT:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

Yeah.

I have no intention of bringing

that u p .
THE COURT:

23

MR. PHILLIPS:

25

Are you also limiting this

Oh, yeah.

22

24

until we are able

pregnant mother routine as far as

19

2i

I'm going

Okay.

All right.

It just accidentally slipped

into the c a s e .
THE COURT:

I think they're entitled to say

